Studies in Hadith and Islamic Law

Is the Authenticity of a Hadīth Sufficient to Practice upon it?


Translator’s Preface

The following is an excerpt from our abridged translation of the masterpiece, Athar al-Hadīth al-Sharīf fī Ikhtilāf al-A’immah alnew 2-Fuqahā’, by the Syrian Hadīth scholar, the teacher of our teachers, Shaykh Muhammad ‘Awwāmah. There were numerous requests for an abridged translation of the work for the benefit of non-Arabic readers, as the original work is relatively lengthy. The abridged translation has now been completed. We will post sections of it in installments and finally publish the complete abridgement in a separate post.

The excerpt before you is a clarification of  two common misunderstandings. The first is the notion that the mere authenticity of a narration is sufficient to practice upon it. The second is the notion that there is no need to follow the Imams of madhhabs because Allah has only commanded us to to follow the Messenger of Allāh and not so and so. The author adequately addresses both notions substantiating his answer with numerous statements from luminaries of Islām. He also explains the harms of adopting such an approach and its devastating implications on the blessed Sunnah.

To make the article more reader-friendly, an idiomatic translation was adopted in several places.

Muntasir Zaman
Sha‘bān, 25, 1435

Is the Authenticity of a Hadīth Sufficient to Practice upon it?

 By Shaykh Muhammad ‘Awwamah

Translated by Muntasir Zaman

The advocates of this notion present their case as follows:

Allah has made it incumbent upon us to follow his beloved Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), so when a Hadīth has been authentically transmitted from him, it is necessary for us to practice on that Hadīth. It does not behoove a Muslim to hesitate in practicing on an authentic Hadīth that reaches him.[1] Allah did not command anyone to follow any other human being, however knowledgeable he may be, as long as he is prone error.

In essence, this objection comprises of two parts:

  1. Authenticity of the Hadīth is sufficient to practice upon it
  2. We are commanded to follow the Messenger of Allah; Allah never commanded us to follow so and so

The answer to the first part of this objection is similar to that given in the previous chapter regarding the statement, “When a Hadīth is authentic, it is my opinion.” In brief, when we say that the authenticity of a Hadīth is sufficient for practice, it refers to when the Hadīth is suitable for practice, which requires both the text [Matn] and chain [Sanad] of the Hadīth to fulfil a number of conditions, among which are conditions pertaining to the science of Hadīth and juristic theory. It is not sufficient to analyze the narrators in the chain by simply referring to Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb as some would wish. This is only the task of expert authorities of Hadīth, its related sciences, fundamentals and peripherals.

This distorted notion will lead to the destruction of the Sunnah, which they apparently want to assist, before the destruction of jurisprudence, not to mention the deviance it will cause.

[Consider this objection in light of the following statements of the great scholars of Hadīth:]

  • Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī mentions, “I hear Ahādīth, after which I examine what is suitable for practice and I practice on it, and I leave the remainder.”[2]
  • Ibn Abī Laylā mentions, “A person will never attain expertise in Hadīth until he takes [what is suitable] and leaves [what is not suitable] from the Hadīth corpus.”[3]
  • ‘Abd Allah ibn Wahb mentions, “If it were not for [Imām] Mālik and al-Layth I would have been destroyed, as I used to think that everything transmitted from the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) should be practiced upon.”[4]
  • Ibn ‘Uqda told a questioner, “Minimize your take of these Ahādīth, as they are not suitable except for those who understand their interpretation. Yahyā ibn Sulaymān reports from Ibn Wahb that he said, ‘I heard Mālik say, ‘Many of these Ahādīth can be a means of deviance. I have mentioned many Ahādīth that I wish I would be lashed twice instead of saying them.”[5]

Shaykh Ismā‘īl al-Ansārī [d. 1417 AH] explains, “This is in relation to those who misinterpret them.” Otherwise, guidance lies in the a of the Prophet. Allāh mentions, “follow him that you may be guided.”[6] However, when a person places something in the wrong place he deviates. It was for this reason that in many verses, Allāh labelled the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) as “wisdom” and wisdom is to place something in its appropriate place.

We learn from these statements that studying Hadīth under the jurists is a means of salvation from destruction, but unfortunately, this reality escapes the minds of the negligent.

Imām al-Tirmidhī after mentioning the Hadīth of Umm ‘Atiyyah that describes the washing of Zaynab, the daughter of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), presents a lengthy analysis and concludes with the following, “In a similar manner have the jurists opined, and they are more knowledgeable regarding the meaning of the Ahādīth.”[7]

In his book, al-Faqīh wa ‘l-Mutafaqqih, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī [d. 463 AH] writes:

It should be understood that an abundance of writing and narrating Ahādīth will not make a person a jurist; he will only attain deep understanding by deducing its meaning and pondering over it.

Thereafter, he mentions the advice of Imām Mālik:

If you wish to benefit from Hadīth and that Allah uses you to benefit others, then minimize your take of Ahādīth and attain deep understanding.[8]

Once al-Mughīra al-Dhabbī was late in attending the gathering of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, so Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī asked him, “O Mughīra, why have you delayed?” He replied, “A shaykh- Hadīth narrator- came to us, so we wrote Ahādīth from him” Ibrahīm said, “I remember that we would never take Ahādīth except from he who can distinguish the Halāl mentioned therein from the Harām and vice versa. Undoubtedly, you will find a shaykh narrating Hadīth, but he will switch its Halāl for its Harām, and vice versa, without even realizing.” [9]

These are some statements concerning the importance of referring to the jurists when examining the Sunnah. We also learn that the matter is not as some claim, i.e. the authenticity of the Hadīth is a sufficient reason for necessitating practice.

There is another issue relating to this claim, and it is necessary to clarify its fallaciousness.  Studying the lives of our predecessors from the Sahābah and those after them, we learn that they would not suffice on the transmission of the Hadīth to practice and apply it; rather, they would first examine if it were suitable for practice.

In this regard, al-Qādhī ‘Iyādh [d. 544 AH] writes:

Chapter on what has been transmitted from the predecessors and scholars pertaining to the necessity of referring to the practice of the people of Madīnah, and that it is an accepted form of evidence according to them even though it conflicts with the majority.

It has been related that ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) stood on the pulpit and said, “I warn by Allāh the person who narrates a Hadīth when practice is contrary to it. Ibn al-Qāsim and Ibn Wahb said, “I have noticed that according to Imām Mālik the status of practice is higher than that of Hadīth.”

Imām Mālik said, “There were scholars from the Tābi‘ūn who would narrate Ahādīth, and when they were informed [of conflicting evidence] from others, they would say, “We are not oblivious to this; however, practice has been established contrary to it.”

Imām Mālik says, “I saw Muhammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn ‘Amr ibn Hazm when he was a judge, and his brother, ‘Abd Allah, knew many Ahādīth and he was a truthful person. When Muhammad would pass a ruling on a matter wherein the Hadīth is contrary to it, I would hear ‘Abd Allah scold him and say, “Is there not so and so Hadīth in this matter?” Muhammad would say, “Obviously.” ‘Abd Allah would say, “Then why do you not judge accordingly?” Muhammad would reply, “So where are the people in relation to it i.e. the consensus of the scholars of Madīnah?” He was alluding to the fact that the status of practice is higher than that of Hadīth.

Ibn Mu‘adhdhal said, “I heard a person ask Ibn Mājishūn, ‘Why do you narrate Ahādīth, after which you do not practice on it” He replied, “To show that we do not practice on it deliberately.”

…Ibn Abī Zinād said, “’Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz would gather the jurists and ask them regarding the Sunnahs and rulings that are practiced on, and would establish them. He would also ask regarding what the people do not practice on, and would omit it even though it was transmitted via a reliable narrator.[10]

Taqī al-Din ibn Taymiyyah [d. 728 AH] writes, “Whichever Sunnah or Athar Imām Ahmad narrates and authenticates, terms Hasan, approves of its Sanad or records in one of his books and did not reject it and did not pass a ruling contrary it, then that is his madhhab. It is also opined that it is not.” [11]

It is important to highlight the words, “…did not refute nor did he pass a ruling contrary it” as this is explicit in that Imām Ahmad, as is the case with the other Imāms, will sometimes prefer a Hadīth that is not authentic over an authentic Hadīth, due to other factors that become apparent to him. We also learn that the authenticity of the Hadīth itself does not necessitate practice upon it.

The salient quality of a scholar is that he partakes of both fields: Hadīth and Fiqh. He should not override one above the other in his academic quest.

In this respect, Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī mentions, “Legal theory [al-Ra’y] is incomplete without Hadīth [al-Riwāya], and Hadīth is incomplete without legal theory.”[12]

Imām al-Khattābī [d. 388 AH] says:

In our time, I have seen the scholars divide into two groups: the partisans of Hadīth and Athar, and the partisans of Fiqh and legal theory. Each group is equal to its counterpart in regards to their need; they are dependent on one another in the acquisition of what they seek. This is because the status of Hadīth is that of the foundation, which is the base, and the status of Fiqh is that of a building, which serves as a branch for it; every building that lacks a solid foundation will inevitably collapse, and every foundation that is void of a building is deserted.[13]

Imām Ahmad [d. 241 AH] mentions:

If a person possesses books on the statements of the Messenger of Allah and the differences of the Sahābah and Tābī‘īn, he is not allowed to practice and pass rulings on whatever he wishes until he inquiries from the scholars which of those narrations are practiced upon, so that his practice may be correct.[14]

It is important to note the words, “…until he enquires from the scholars which of those narrations are practiced upon” as there is an indication therein that perhaps a person may consider a Hadīth authentic and pass a ruling based on its authenticity, and that the authenticity of the Hadīth is a sufficient reason for practice. However, Imām Ahmad cautions that this sort of hastiness and haphazard method of passing verdicts is impermissible and that it is necessary to ask the people of knowledge, who are the people of Fiqh and understanding, “Should we practice on this particular Hadīth” and they will inform if the Hadīth is suitable for practice.

In the entry of Ibn Hazam in Siyar A‘lām al-Nubalā’, under his statement, “I will follow the truth and exercise ijtihād, and I will not restrict myself to any madhhab” Hāfiż al-Dhahabī writes:

Yes, the one who has reached the rank of ijtihād and a group of Imāms testify to that is not allowed to make taqlīd. Likewise, a novice and general jurist who memorizes the Qur’ān or a great portion of it cannot exercise ijtihād at all. How is he supposed to exercise ijtihād? What will he say? What will be the premise of his conclusions? How will he fly when is yet to grow wings?

The third category is the accomplished, alert, insightful, traditionist jurist, who has memorized a mukhtasar on the peripheral laws and a book on the rules of juristic theory, and he has studied syntax and he has a share in the virtues, along with his memorization of the Book of Allah and his preoccupation with its commentary and his strong argumentation. This is the rank of the one who has reached restricted ijtihad and is capable of examining the evidences of the imams. Hence, whenever the truth is clear to him in an issue, and a source text is established therein, and one of the luminary Imams has acted upon it, like Abu Hanifah, for example, or Malik, al-Thawri, al-Awza’i, al-Shafi’i, Abu ‘Ubayd and Ishaq, he ought to follow the truth therein and not follow dispensations. He must be cautious. He does not have the option of taqlīd therein after the proof has been established for him…[15]

It is important to note the words, “…whenever the truth is clear to him in an issue, and a source text is established therein, and one of the luminary Imams has acted upon it” and his previous statement, “the one who practices upon an authentic narration which the luminary Imāms did not accept it, then no.”

Adhering to an opinion that no one has articulated is regarded as insanity in the sight of the intellects and scholars alike. Imām Zufar [d. 158 AH] mentions:

I do not debate someone until he admits, “I have erred.” Rather I debate him until he loses his sanity! It was asked, “How does he lose his sanity?” He replied, “He articulates an opinion no one has opined.” [16]

If you object:

What about the statement of Imām al-Subkī regarding the person who finds an authentic narration that no one has practiced upon, whether he is allowed to practice upon he Hadīth? Imām al-Subkī states, “According to me, it is better that he follows the Hadīth, and he should assume that he is in front of the Prophet and he heard it directly from him. In such a situation, is it permissible for him to delay? By the name of Allāh, never. Each person is responsible according to his understanding.[17]

Firstly, al-Subki clearly states that this is his personal opinion which means that other scholars differ with him in that it is necessary for an Imām to have practiced upon it, such al-Dhahabī whose statement just passed. This does not mean that the practice of the Imām is superior to the Hadīth without which the Hadīth cannot serve as evidence. Rather, it means that the practice of the Imām is proof that there is no consensus on not practicing upon that Hadīth, because if no one has practiced upon it, it shows that there is another Hadīth, which is preferred over this one. There are numerous statements from the Salaf, some of which has passed, that sometimes a Hadīth can be authentic but practice is not upon it.

Secondly, the words, “he should assume that he is in front of the Prophet and he heard it directly from him. In such a situation, is it permissible for him to delay?” are subtle and require deep understanding. This is regarding a person who heard only one Hadīth on the topic directly from the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him). However, in our situation, that is centuries later and with knowledge of two narrations on the topic, such as the narration of Zayd ibn Thābit “Make wudū from what has touched the fire”[18] and the narration of Ibn ‘Abbās, “The Prophet partook of three morsels from meat and bread, after which he performed Salāt without renewing wudū” [19]

Each Sahābī has taken their respective narrations directly from the Prophet. Thus, it is not permissible for any of them to delay in their practice upon what they witnessed, just as al-Subkī mentioned. However, those who came later and found both narrations will undoubtedly have to find factors that give preference to one narration above the other, such as the narration of Jābir, “the last action of the Prophet was to not make wudū from that which touched the fire.” [20]

Accordingly, the situation of the one who did not hear directly from the Prophet will differ from the situation of the one who “assumes he is in front in front of the Prophet and he heard it directly from him.” The one who will not practice upon one of the narrations will practice upon the other narration knowing that there are two narrations on the topic. As for the one who heard it directly, he will also practice upon one of the narrations but without knowledge of the other narration, due to which he will practice upon what he heard.

Thus, Ibn ‘Abbās witnessed the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) partake three morsels of meat after which he performed Salāt without renewing his wudū. When Abū Hurayrah narrated to him the Hadīth, “make wudū from what has touched the fire”, Ibn ‘Abbās did not practice upon it, because of what he witnessed himself and giving preference over what he heard through an intermediary. It cannot be said to Ibn ‘Abbās, “assume that you are in front of the Prophet…” and it cannot be said, “How can you delay practicing upon what has reached you from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him).

This reminds us of another incident of Ibn ‘Abbās, which has a great lesson in the discussion at hand. Imām Ahmad narrates:

‘Urwah ibn Zubayr told Ibn ‘Abbās (Allāh be pleased with them), “O Ibn ‘Abbās, you have led the people astray.” He asked, “O ‘Urayyah,[21] how is that?” He said, “You are giving the verdict that when the people make tawāf, they come out of ihram, whereas Abū Bakr and ‘Umar would make the talbiyah of Hajj and would remain in the state of ihram until the day of Nahr.” Ibn ‘Abbās said, “Rather, you have gone astray by this. I tell you of the Hadīth of the Prophet and you are telling me about Abū Bakr and ‘Umar!” ‘Urwah said, “Undoubtedly, Abū Bakr and ‘Umar were more knowledgeable than you about the Prophet.” [22]

This is our answer to those who are calling for the abandonment of the jurisprudence of Abū Hanīfah, Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, Ahmad, in lieu of the jurisprudence of the Sunnah and Qur’ān (Fiqh al-Sunnah wa ‘l-Kitāb) or whatever title it may have. We will say that we are not happy with you as a substitute for them (i.e. the Imāms) as they were more knowledgeable about the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Rather, it is incorrect to say “more knowledgeable” because there is no comparison between you and them in knowledge. Our zeal to adhere to the Sunnah has prompted us to practice according to their understanding of the blessed Sunnah.

Did Allah Commanded Us to Follow Anyone Besides His Messenger?

[As was mentioned above, this objection comprises of two parts.] The second part of the objection is “We are commanded to follow the Messenger of Allah; Allah never commanded us to follow so and so.” We say to such a person that the implications of your statement is that the Imāms of Islām, who have impressed on the rigid adherence to the Sunnah and that leaving it academically or practically is crookedness, loss and deviation.

Moreover, the implications of your statement is that these Imāms were not upon guidance and the path of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) due to which you wish to follow the Prophet through a different path.

It seems as though you consider them as such, due to what you have heard from those who reject following the four madhhabs based on the verse of Qur’ān, “they have taken their priests and rabbis as gods besides Allāh.”  Thereafter they mention the Hadīth of ‘Adī ibn Hātim wherein he told the Messenger of Allāh, “They do not worship them” and the Messenger of Allāh responded, “Why not? They made lawful for them the unlawful and made unlawful for them the lawful and the people followed them. That is their worship of them.” Thus, they tell those who make taqlīd, “You have taken so and so as gods besides Allāh: they make lawful for you and unlawful!”

What a gross misinterpretation of the speech of Allāh. Undoubtedly, the Imāms of Islām attempted their utmost to establish the truth as they understood it from the Qur’ān and Sunnah. As for the priests and rabbis, they would interpolate the divine scriptures to secure their worldly objectives. It is necessary to review the statements of the Imāms mentioned in the opening of the book, such as Imām Abū Hanīfah’s statement, “The abandonment of the Sunnah is deviance and acquiring knowledge without it is corruption.”

These Imāms adhered more strictly to the Sunnah than the minds of their supporters can fathom. They simply conveyed to the people the instructions and prohibitions of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah), just as a mu’dhdhin repeats the Takbīrs of the Imām for the people in back rows during prayer.

If you ask:

I want to understand the rulings of my religion based on evidence and I fail to understand this particular ruling according to the view of Imām Abū Hanīf. However, I understand it according to the view of Imām al-Shāfi‘ī. Since, I am not content on practicing an action until I understand the evidence, is there leeway for me to practice on the Shāfi‘ī Madhhab?”

The answer is that the underlying cause of shifting from one madhhab to another is one of the following:

  • The tqalīd was due to certain circumstances that befell the muqallid. There is no problem with this.
  • One wishes to seek the concessions of the different madhhabs. This is impermissible.
  • Because of  research and ijtihād in a particular ruling: thus, it will be checked:

If the person in reference fulfils the relevant prerequisites for such a task i.e. giving preference between the evidences of the jurists, and is unprejudiced, then there is no objection with this. Rather, this is an object of pride for Islāmic jurisprudence and Muslim scholars. How can one object to this countless latter-day scholars, have done so, let alone early scholars, such as al-Nawawī, Ibn al-Salāh, al-‘Izz ibn ‘Abd al-Salām et al. (may Allah have mercy on them all).

Even ‘Allāmah Zāhid al-Kawtharī, who despite being criticized as a fanatical adherent of the Hanafī madhhab, left the opinion of Imām Abū Hanīfahin an issue of Waqf, and chose the opinion of the majority because it was supported by authentic narrations and the practice of the Sahābah.

Similarly, in his voluminous work, I’lā’ al-Sunan, ‘Allāmah Zafar Ahmad al-‘Uthmānī has in many instances left the established view of the Hanafī madhhab, despite his strict adherence to the madhhab throughout his book.

However, if he lacks the necessary conditions and is bias in his research, as is the condition of these arrogant pseudo-scholars who violate the respect of the Salaf by claiming to ascribe to them, then this is deviation and disputation. This is what we disapprove of and give no scope for anyone to do, regardless of the labels and titles attached to his name.

We tell these deceived people that shifting from the Hanafī madhhab to the Shāfī‘ī madhhab in this issue will lead to shifting to the Mālikī madhhab, for example, in another issue, and to the Hanbalī madhhab in another issue, until he returns to Hanafī madhhab in a fourth issue or even opts for an opinion from an abandoned school of jurisprudence outside of the four madhhabs.

It was this type of shifting that ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was referring to when he said, “Whoever makes his religion a matter of disputation, will constantly change his view.” Once a person by the name of Abū‘l-Juwayriyyah, who was accused of al-Irjā [postponement] came to Imām Mālik and said, “O Abū‘Abd Allah, listen to my view and let me argue with you over it.” Imām Mālik asked him, “And if you silence me?” he replied, “You will follow me.” Imām Mālik said, “If I silence you?” he said, “I will follow you.” Imām Mālik said, “And if a third person comes and silences us both.” He said, “We will follow him.” Imām Mālik said, “Allāh sent Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) with one religion and you wish to constantly shift. ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz said, “Whoever makes his religion a matter of disputation, will constantly shift his view.”[23]

Thus, the one who claims to follow evidence in a manner other than following the Imāms will eventually opt for an opinion no one ever adhered to without even realizing. Even worse, he will claim that he is assisting the Sunnah and spreading its message. This stance will pave the way to what proceeds it, which Imām Mālik beautifully notes:

Submit to the jurists and do not dispute with them. If we were to follow every person who was a better debater, we fear that we would eventually reject what Jibrā’īl brought. [24]

In addition, your claim of understanding the evidence of this ruling according to Imām al-Shāfi‘ī and not Imam Abū Hanīfah is similar to the condition of those scholars who left the madhhab of Imām al-Shāfi‘ī and practiced on what they considered to be authentic due the authenticity of the Hadīth in that regard. Rather, your claim is identical to their claim, and you have seen the consequences of that. Allah be pleased with Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah who said, “Submitting to the jurists is protection in religion.” [25]

It should be noted that Imām Mālik, Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah, and Ibn Wahb, concur on the necessity of referring to the jurists otherwise a person is in danger in his religion. It was for this reason that the scholars of Hadīth understood the value of Fiqh and the Fuqahā’, and they would encourage their students to engage in Fiqh and accompany the Imams of Fiqh.

A person came to Zuhayr Ibn Mu‘āwiyah, so Zuhayr asked him, “Where have you come from?” He replied, “From Abū Hanīfah.” Zuhayr said, “Your visit to Abū Hanīfah for one day is more beneficial for you than coming to me for one month.”[26]

In al-Hāwī, Imām al-Suyūtī [d. 911 AH] mentions:

The elders mention, “A Hadīth scholar without Fiqh is a like a pharmacist; he possesses the medicine but lacks the knowledge of what their used for; a jurist without Hadīth is like a physician; he understands the usage of the medicine but does not possess it. [27]


[1] As we learn from the answer al-Shāfī‘ī gave to al-Humaydī when he asked if he was going to practice on a particular narration that he related. Al-Shafī‘ī responded, “Did you see me exit from a church with a crucifix on my neck due to which I would listen to Hadīth of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), yet not practice on it?”

[2] Ibn Rajab, Sharh ‘Ilal al-Tirmidhī, 413:1

[3] Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Jāmi‘ Bayān al-‘Ilm, 130:2

[4] Ibn Rajab, Sharh ‘Ilal al-Tirmidhī, 413:1

[5] Al-Khatīb, al-Faqīh wa ‘l-Mutafaqqih, 81:2

[6] Sūrat al-A‘rāf, verse 158

[7] Al-Tirmidhī, al-Sunan, 372:3

[8] Al-Khatīb, al-Faqīh wa ‘l-Mutafaqqih, 81:2

[9] A similar report is mentioned in al-Tamhīd of Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, 29:1

[10] Al-Qādī ‘Iyād, Tartīb al-Madārik, 66:1

[11] Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Musawwadah, 530

[12] Al-Asfahānī, Hilyat al-Awliyā’, 325:4

[13] Al-Khattābī, Ma‘ālim al-Sunan, 3:1

[14] Ibn al-Qayyim, I’lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn, 44:1

[15] Al-Dhahabī, Siyar A‘lām al-Nubalā’, 191:18

[16] Al-Saymarī, Akhbār Abī Hanīfah wa Ashābih, 110

[17] Al-Taqī al-Subkī, Ma‘ā Qawl al-Imām, 107

[18] Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, 282:1

[19] Ibid. 284:1

[20] Abū Dāwūd, al-Sunan, 241:1

[21] The diminutive of ‘Urwah

[22] Ahmad, al-Musnad, 252:1

[23] Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Intiqā’, 33

[24] Al-Sha‘rānī, al-Mīzān al-Kubrā, 51:1

[25] Al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-Mudīiyyah, 453:1

[26] Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Intiqā’, 207

[27] Al-Suyūtī, al-Hāwī, 398:2


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